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Abstract
The dual economy model, built on classical foundations, served as the cornerstone of development
theory for several decades after World War II.  It subsequently came under neo-classical micro-
econometric attack and has fallen into general disuse, at least within the Anglo-Saxon academic
establishment.  This paper presents a brief intellectual history of the framework and tries to respond to some
of the criticisms that have been leveled against it—some peripheral, others central.  We then proceed to
inquire into the usefulness of the dual economy model for understanding both historical and contemporary
real world situations and for development policy.  We conclude by asking whether recent theoretical
developments in economics offer an opportunity for reassessing the relevance of the model.
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I.  Introduction 
In the 1950s and 1960s, a neglected sub-field of economics was rediscovered:  
development economics, concerned with describing the economies of the world’s poor countries, 
which even then accounted for more than half of the world’s population.  The economic 
problems facing these countries—many of them newly independent—were clearly acute and 
their development was seen as an urgent priority for both analysis and policy action. 
Available economic models, however, seemed to offer only limited insights into the 
practical problems facing these countries.  These were not modern industrial economies; most 
people worked not in factories but in subsistence agriculture or in urban informal jobs—from 
shoe shining to small-scale peddling to distributive trades and artisanal crafts.  The dominant 
one-sector macro models of the day, from Keynesian to Harrod-Domar to Solow, seemed to have 
limited relevance for societies not primarily concerned with business cycle or steady state 
properties.  Most contemporary growth models were seen as academic abstractions with little 
policy relevance.  And the dominant assumptions of neoclassical micro theory—full 
employment, market clearing and perfect competition—seemed to have little relevance for the 
segmented commodity, labor, and credit markets of poor countries. 
Against this backdrop, the concept of dualism attracted considerable attention.  
Sociological dualism, associated with the name of Boeke,
1 emphasized differences between 
Western economic and non-Western cultures and objectives.  Technological dualism, 
emphasized by Higgins
2 and Eckaus
3 focused on the difference between variable factor 
proportions in traditional and fixed coefficients in modern sectors.  A third, and undoubtedly 
                                                 
1 Boeke, J.H. (1953), Economics and Economic Policy in Dual Societies, Institute of Pacific Relations.  
2 Higgins, B. (1956) ”The ‘Dualistic Theory’ of Underdeveloped Areas,” Economic Development and Cultural 
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dominant strand, focused on the coexistence of sectors which are basically asymmetrical—and 
thus dualistic—in some key economic dimension. 
Undoubtedly the first clear manifestation of this third version of dualism appeared in the 
tableau economique of the physiocrats.  Although the emphasis there was on one preponderant 
“productive” sector, agriculture, the physiocrats also clearly envisioned its coexistence with a 
small non-agricultural (to them “non-productive”) sector, providing services, artisanal goods and 
other requirements of the ruling nobility—if the “produit net” of the soil (read agricultural 
surplus) was large enough to permit some labor reallocation.  This essentially circular flow 
mechanism may yield slow increases in real per capita income over time as the productivity-
enhancing results of “father teaching son” plus inter-regional specialization and an enhanced 
division of labor lead to increases in agricultural productivity.  But these represent limited 
amendments to what is basically a static situation, with the “serfs” in the system, mostly in 
agriculture, some allocated outside, continuing to maintain a virtually constant consumption 
standard. 
Physiocratic dualism, which emphasized the fundamental primacy of agriculture, the 
importance of an agricultural surplus and the long run prognosis of stagnation, gave way to the 
concept of classical dualism, more or less coincident with the advent of the so-called industrial 
revolution in Western Europe.  This classical concept á la Ricardo
4 (1815) focused on the 
coexistence of still overwhelmingly dominant agricultural activities subject to diminishing 
returns to labor on the basically fixed land—and non-agricultural activities, growing as a 
consequence mainly of the accumulation of fixed capital.  While the classical school did not 
model the interactions between these two sectors, it is clear that the main fuel for the reallocation 
                                                 







of workers and the accumulation of industrial capital was seen as coming from the “profits” of 
agricultural capitalists, i.e. the agricultural surplus left over after agricultural workers and 
landlords (who were assumed to consume everything) had been paid off.  It should be noted that 
the classicists also introduced the related assumption of the near fixity of land combined with 
Malthusian population pressures and that they retained the notion of an institutionally determined 
real wage in agriculture—even though the laboring class was now free and could bargain with 
the capitalists in setting the level of that wage. 
While the classicists differed amongst themselves with respect to their overall prognosis 
for the dual economy as a whole, Ricardian-Malthusian pessimism with respect to the 
agricultural sector’s ultimate stagnation was a dominant feature of their overall analytical work.  
In the absence of marked technology change, either generated within agriculture or via modern 
inputs from non-agriculture, agricultural stagnation and thus the drying up of the needed 
agricultural surplus represented the dominant long-term outlook.  Whether technology change 
and the exploration of economies of scale within the industrial sector, reflecting Smith’s 
optimism,
5 would be sufficiently strong to provide enough industrial profits to rescue the 
situation remained controversial. 
It was, of course, Arthur Lewis who in his famous 1954 article
6 built on some of the main 
ingredients of this classical tradition leading him to emphasize dualism in labor markets, i.e., a 
competitive wage in non-agriculture but tied to a wage in excess of a very low, if not zero, 
marginal product in agriculture.  Lewis, moreover, found himself allied with Smith, seeing the 
relatively small non-agricultural or commercialized sector as dynamic and expanding, fed by the 
                                                 
5 Smith, A. (1880), The Wealth of Nations.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press. 







mobilization of the “hidden rural savings” of Nurkse
7 and Rosenstein-Rodan,
8 enabling the 
reallocation of workers into higher productivity activities, while wage levels were kept relatively 
low, at a modest “hill” over the agricultural wage.  This reallocation process would continue 
until all the “surplus labor,” i.e. all those whose remuneration exceeded their marginal product, 
had been reallocated, marking a turning point at which dualism atrophies and the economy 
becomes fully commercialized or neo-classical. 
In Section II, we will trace the further development of the dual economy model in the 
Lewis tradition.  In Section III we will examine the criticisms which have been leveled against it 
by the neo-classical school, differentiating between what may be referred to as popular “red 
herring” attacks and more central critiques.  Section IV will inquire into the current normative 
usefulness of the concept for both analytical and policy purposes.  Section V concludes. 
 
II.  The Modern Dimensions of Dualism 
We will concentrate here on dualism in the labor market and, for reasons of convenience, 
restrict ourselves to the closed economy—relevant to all but very small economies.
9  Dualism, of 
course, matters only when an economy’s agricultural sector is initially relatively large and 
represented substantially by extended family or collective farm cultivation, often labeled 
“subsistence agriculture,” in contrast to commercialized or plantation agriculture. 
The critical organizational characteristics of this sector is that, at a given technology, the 
man/land ratio is such that marginal labor productivity is very low (if not zero or negative), while 
                                                 
7 Nurske, R., (1953), Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, New York:  Oxford University 
Press. 
8 Rosenstein-Rodan, (1943), “The Problem of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe,” Economic 
Journal, 53, 202-211. 
9 For the open economy implications of the Fei-Ranis dual economy model, see Ranis, Gustav (1988), “Analytics of 
Development:  Dualism,” in H.B. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, eds.,  Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 






key decision makers such as heads of families, village elders or commune leaders feel obliged to 
share output with all members of these groups, even if such shares exceed the marginal product.  
In other words, income is shared, or an institutional wage is determined based on bargaining 
rather than neo-classical principles.  Moreover, the gap between this institutional wage in non-
commercialized agriculture and the commercialized non-agricultural wage is likely to be in 
excess of the modest 50% “hill” asserted by Lewis and is materially affected by such 
institutional urban formal sector interventions as minimum wage legislation, union pressure and 
government wage setting.  Extending the Lewis model further, there are likely to exist similar 
configurations in the so-called urban informal sector, with family enterprises lacking sufficient 
cooperating capital and forced to pursue service sector and distributive trade activities which 
yield low marginal labor productivities but are again characterized by a similar pooling of 
income in an extended family context.  In both cases everyone “in the same kitchen” is fed and 
average, rather than marginal, product is relevant to the size of the shares. 
In addition to the organizational dimensions of dualism, emphasized by Lewis, there is a 
product dimension, focused on the exchange between food produced by the peasant agricultural 
sector and the non-agricultural goods produced in the urban (and/or rural) commercialized non-
agricultural sector.  The inter-action between these two sectors, extending beyond the inter-
sectoral labor market into the inter-sectoral commodity and financial markets, was fully analyzed 
by Fei and Ranis.
10 The key point here is that agricultural and non-agricultural products cannot 
readily be substituted for each other; in the closed economy food-producing agriculture becomes 
a necessary condition for industry, while the converse does not hold.  Consequently, if 
                                                 
10 Ranis, Gustav and John C.H. Fei (1961), “A Theory of Economic Development,” American Economic Review, 
51, 533-565. And Fei, John C.H. and Gustav Ranis  (1964), Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory 
and Policy.  See also the emphasis on product dualism in R. Kanbur and J. McIntosh (1985), ‘Dual Economy 






agriculture lags behind non-agriculture during the labor reallocation process the deterioration of 
the non-agricultural sector’s terms of trade may well cause a rise in the agricultural wage, as well 
as in the related unskilled non-agricultural real wage, and a consequent retardation if not collapse 
of the labor reallocation process long before the labor surplus has been eliminated.  This “turning 
point,” in contrast to Lewis’, signals the relative inability of the system to follow a “balanced 
growth” path according to which agricultural productivity keeps pace with advances in non-
agriculture and inter-sectoral commodity as well as financial and labor markets can clear at given 
terms of trade. 
Other modifications of the basic Lewis model can be found in Harris-Todaro
11 and 
Fields.
12 While Harris-Todaro’s main innovation was to introduce the notion that labor 
reallocation is affected not only by the inter-sectoral wage gap but also by the probability of 
obtaining a formal sector non-agricultural job; they accepted the notion of an institutional impact 
on the level of the non-agricultural urban wage but insisted on an equally competitive, i.e., neo-
classical, agricultural wage.  Fields, however, pointed out that the two choices for migrants 
offered by Harris-Todaro, a formal sector job or open urban unemployment, needed to be 
amended by introducing the urban informal sector.  Indeed, just as in agriculture, very few urban 
residents can afford to be openly unemployed and rely on non-existent unemployment insurance.  
Instead, they fall back on the family, while working at very low levels of productivity, i.e. they 
are the urban underemployed. 
                                                 
11 Harris, J. and M. Todaro (1970), “Migration, Unemployment and Development:  A Two Sector Analysis,” 
American Economic Review, 40, 126-142. 
12 Fields, G.S. (1975) “Rural-Urban Migration, Urban Unemployment and Underemployment and Job Search 







Finally, Ranis and Stewart
13 further amended the basic dualistic model by suggesting the 
need to trace the interactions among four sectors once we further disaggregate the urban informal 
sector between a non-traditional dynamic sub-sector, with sub-contracting ties to the urban 
formal sector, and a traditional static sub-sector, serving as a low productivity sponge.  The very 
meaning of “dualism” of course becomes somewhat tenuous as we move away from the basic 
two-sector Lewis model but, even though inter-sectoral relations become increasingly mind-
blowing to trace, the basic asymmetries in labor market behavior remain critical for both 
analytical and policy purposes. 
 
III.  Neo-Classical Critiques and Responses 
Dualism has been subjected to much criticism and attack over the past several decades.  It 
has virtually disappeared from contemporary development discourse in the OECD countries, 
except via textbooks including intellectual history.  Some of this may be termed not so much 
malign neglect as a consequence of the development sub-discipline, along with the rest of 
economics, moving away from grand macro-theorizing to a micro-econometric focus.  But much 
of the attack has also focused quite specifically on the theory of dualism because of its 
“unacceptable” assumptions about labor market behavior.  In spite of its apparent real world 
empirical relevance—on which more below—the critics reject out of hand any bargaining 
outcome which cannot be modeled precisely within a neo-classical framework.  
Some of the specific critiques on record may be viewed as “red herrings” and can be 
readily responded to; others are more profound and require more careful consideration. Perhaps 
the leading attack in the “red herring” category was occasioned by the unfortunate choice of the  
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“labor surplus” term deployed by Nurkse, Lewis, Fei-Ranis and others.  This was widely 
interpreted as implying a zero marginal product in agriculture and led to the famous T.W. 
Schultz/Sen exchange
14 on whether or not a reallocation (or in this case demise) of part of the 
agricultural labor force could be expected to leave agricultural output unaffected.  This 
misperception arose due to incautious asides in Lewis’ 1954 paper and mainly due to 
mathematical convenience in Fei/Ranis’ 1961 and 1964 contributions.  The basic point is that the 
marginal product is low, and sufficiently low to fall below the bargaining wage or income share.  
As Lewis put it in his 1972 retrospective piece
15 “whether marginal productivity is zero or 
negligible is not at the core of fundamental importance to our analysis…this has led to an 
irrelevant and intemperate controversy.”  But the controversy has persisted.  Otsuka in his review 
of Fei/Ranis’ 1997 book
16 considers the zero marginal product notion as deeply embedded in the 
dual economy model but acknowledges that such a stark assumption is both empirically unlikely 
and theoretically unnecessary.  What is necessary is that, during any short period of time, there 
exists an excess supply of labor at the going wage. 
Does this mean that the reallocation of labor necessarily causes a food shortage, or the 
arrival of the Fei-Ranis “shortage point?”  Again, as Fei-Ranis took pains to point out, a 
withdrawal of labor is highly likely to lead to a simultaneous reorganization of agricultural 
production, in effect an upward shift in agricultural labor productivity, permitting the 
maintenance, if not even an increase, of the agricultural surplus available for transfer to non-
                                                 
14 Sen, Amartya Kumar (1967), “Surplus Labor in India:  A Critique of Schultz’ Statistical Test,” Economic Journal, 
77, 154-161. 
15 Lewis, W.A. (1972), “Reflections on Unlimited Labor,” in Luis DiMarco (ed.), International Economics and 
Development:  Essays in Honor of Raul Prebisch, New York:  Academic Press, pp. 75-96 
16Otsuka, K. (2001), Book Review of “Growth and Development from an Evolutionary Perspective,” Journal of 






agriculture.  Thus, the inter-sectoral terms of trade need not deteriorate against industry—unless, 
of course, there is a marked relative neglect of agriculture in the “balanced growth” context. 
A second critique, again in the “red herring” category, dealt with the level of the 
exogenously given institutional wage.  The neo-classical school, of course, fundamentally rejects 
the notion of an institutional or bargaining wage since it cannot be deduced from basic 
principles. But the fact that wages are, in fact, observed as not constant over time can be easily 
disposed of.  Otsuka
17, for example, claims he has “never encountered institutionally determined 
rigid wage rates in agrarian communities”. This ignores the fact that it is the sharing rule, not the 
level of a wage, which may well vary over time, which is at stake.  The dual economy 
assumption is that agricultural wages are related to, but not necessarily equal to, the average 
product of agricultural workers, since the head of the household, or whoever else commands the 
agricultural surplus, is bound to retain a portion for her own reinvestment purposes.  As the 
average product rises with technical change, the agricultural bargaining wage is also likely to 
change.  Thus, over time, we are likely to see a gently rising, not a horizontal, Lewis-type supply 
curve of labor.  Over short periods of time it is horizontal; but what we have over longer periods 
is a step function made up of annual unlimited supply of labor segments, econometrically 
undistinguishable from a gently rising supply curve. 
Let me cite, in passing, a few other criticisms of some assumptions of the dualism model, 
all of which have some validity but none of which are critical one way or the other.  They 
include the adoption of the classical assumption that all wages are consumed and all profits are 
saved; that the system is savings-pushed, i.e., that Say’s Law holds; and that all investment funds 
are allocated to the commercialized or non-agricultural sectors.  There would be absolutely no 
                                                 






problem in modifying any of these simplifying assumptions without any damage to the basic 
dualistic model. 
Let us then turn to the crux of the critique, the rejection of a bargaining wage or 
consumption share exceeding the marginal product of labor at any point in time.  I assume it is 
not difficult to see that in the kind of setting under discussion, i.e. extended family or other 
communal institutional arrangements, the unfavorable ratio of people to cooperating factors as 
part of the initial condition is not something under the control of decision makers, and that such 
decision makers cannot simply fire low productivity members to reach a neo-classical 
equilibrium or refuse to share much of the group’s income with them.  Fafchamps
18 provides an 
overview of the principles underlying the resulting “solidarity network” among peasants as 
depicted in the anthropological evidence of Geertz
19 and Scott.
20  Ishikawa,
21 an astute long-time 
observer of Asian economic development, endorses the concept of a “minimum subsistence level 
of existence” (MSL), one version of the institutional real wage.  His work indicates the 
prevalence of a “community principle of employment and income distribution which promises 
all families…..an income not less than MSL.” Hayami and Kikuchi
22 find that in Indonesia 
“wages do not adjust on the basis of labor’s marginal product, but according to the subsistence 
requirements of the time and social conventions.”  Only over time is there a tendency to adjust 
but even then it does not necessarily occur by altering wages to equal the marginal product, 
which could reduce the wage below subsistence.  Instead, in Java harvest contracts began to 
                                                 
18Fafchamps, M., (1992), “Solidarity Networks in Preindustrial Societies:  Rational Peasants with a Moral 
Economy,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 41, 147-174. 
19Geertz, Clifford (1963), Agricultural Involution:  The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia, University of 
California Press. 
20Scott, J.C. (1976), The Moral Economy of the Peasant, New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press. 
21 Ishikawa, S. (1975), “Peasant Families and the Agrarian Community in the Process of Economic Development,” 
in L. Reynolds, (ed.), Agriculture in Development Theory, (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT). 
22Hayami, Y. and M. Kikuchi (1982), Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads. Baltimore, MD:  Johns Hopkins 






include weeding duties without a complementary rise in the wage rate, thereby not threatening 
the MSL but moving institutionally towards equilibrium.  Osmani
23 presents a model of 
downward rigidity of the sharing rule insisted on by the workers themselves.  Current work in 
what is called behavioral economics may also prove to be of help in developing a theoretical 
structure to rationalize cross-worker subsidization in the absence of assured reciprocity—
especially as some members of the group are likely to be leaving agriculture over time. 
Finally, we have ample historical evidence, e.g. for England from 1780 to 1840,
24 for 
Japan from 1870 to 1920,
25 for Taiwan from 1950 to 1970
26, of labor abundant agriculture 
witnessing hefty increases in average agricultural labor productivity, while the agricultural wage 
rises only gently, i.e., lags substantially behind, until the commercialization or Lewis turning 
point is reached.  As Sen
27 has pointed out, even a horizontal supply curve of labor can be made 
consistent with a neo-classical explanation; but you have to work hard to make the pre-conceived 
theory fit the facts.  And these facts are also fully consistent with an institutional wage which is 
gently rising as a result of the step function process previously described until, as in the country 
cases cited above, the turning point is reached and wages begin to rise steeply in concert with 
rising marginal productivity.  But before that point is reached, a rising gap between agricultural 
productivity and wage levels is certainly not consistent with neo-classical assumptions about 
market clearance. 
                                                 
23Osmani, S.R., (1991), “Wage Determination in Rural Labor Markets:  The Theory of Implicit Cooperation,” 
Journal of Development Economics, 34, 3-23. 
24 Williamson cites such evidence of rising agricultural productivity and nearly constant real wages after the 
enclosure movement created a “labor surplus” condition. 
25 Fei, John C.H. and Gustav Ranis,(1997) Growth and Development From an Evolutionary Perspective, Blackwell. 
26 Fei and Ranis, ibid. 
27 Sen, Amartya Kumar (1966), “Peasants and Dualism With and Without Surplus Labor,” Journal of Political 







28 and others have presented micro-econometric evidence of steeply rising 
labor supply curves in a cross-section in heavily populated agricultural settings such as India and 
claim that this puts the final nail into the coffin of the classical dualistic model.  However, this is 
an expressly static relationship and does not address a developing economy’s dynamic transition 
process.  Moreover, as we have shown elsewhere
29 we would expect individual family labor 
responses to be quite inelastic at any point in time.  Faced with hypothetical wage changes, hard-
working, if not highly productive, agricultural family workers are not likely to have much room 
for trading off leisure for additional work.  Rosenzweig’s findings are inherently reasonable but 
they address a different issue.  He is concerned with the cross-sectional labor/leisure decisions 
across agricultural households, while dualistic models are interested in the conditions governing 
inter-sectoral labor reallocation in a time series context. 
 
IV.  Does the Dual Economy Model Still Serve a Useful Purpose? 
Even if it were accepted that dualism is a useful construct for understanding the historical 
development experience of a number of countries, including England, Japan, and Taiwan, among 
others, does it have any empirical relevance for today’s world; and even more importantly, how 
does it relate to contemporary theorizing in the “new growth theory” or “new institutional 
economics” traditions? 
We would contend that China, India, Bangladesh, as well as much of Central America 
and some portions of South America, comprising a majority of the people on earth, still meet the 
initial conditions for dualism relevance, i.e., a substantial food producing agricultural sector 
marked by heavy population pressure on scarce land, complemented by large urban informal 
                                                 
28Rosenzweig, M. (1988), “Labor Markets in Low Income Countries,” in H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, eds., 
Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 1. Amsterdam:  North Holland.45. 






sectors.  And, while Sub-Saharan Africa was once described as “land surplus,” there is 
increasing evidence, from high fertility rates, changing cultivation practices and a general 
reduction of fallow periods, that this pivotal region is also moving in the same direction.  In these 
settings the issue addressed with the help of the dualism model, i.e., how to mobilize an 
agricultural surplus by reallocating an underemployed labor force into efficient non-agricultural 
pursuits, remains at the top of the development agenda. 
The dualistic theory nexus, moreover, remains useful for a number of analytical reasons, 
including concerning the relationship between growth and the distribution of income, for the 
determination of the domestic inter-sectoral terms of trade, as well as for the choice of 
technology and of the direction of technology change. The effort to understand the relationship 
between growth and the distribution of income was first brought to our attention by Simon 
Kuznets in 1955
30.  While Kuznets emphasized the structural change an economy experiences as 
it shifts from initially dominant A (agriculture) to M (manufacturing) and S (services) sectors 
over time, his explanation of the famous inverted U-shaped pattern between growth and 
distribution embraced the dualistic model.  The basic cause for the initial worsening of 
distribution was the reallocation of workers from a more equally distributed agricultural sector to 
a less equally distributed non-agricultural sector--with wages kept relatively low and savings 
rates rising--while the eventual improvement of equity is related to the upswing of real wages as 
full employment is reached everywhere.  Bourguignon and Morrison
31 see “the persistence of 
economic dualism as a powerful explanatory factor of cross-country differences in inequality.” 
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While work by Fei, Ranis, and Kuo,
32 Fields
33 and others has shown that no inevitability should 
be attached to the suggested inverse U-shaped path, it is clear that the nature of the growth 
pattern viewed in an expressly dualistic context determines its relationship to equity over time, 
differing markedly between the period before and after the commercialization point. 
This concern about the relationship between growth and equity eventually spilled over 
into a focus on what is happening to poverty levels.
34  The notion of only gently rising real 
wages in both agriculture and non-agriculture during the pre-commercialization epoch affects not 
only labor, commodity and financial exchanges between the sectors but also has a definite 
impact on technology, favoring labor-intensive technology choices statically and labor-using 
technology choices dynamically. The reversals in these dimensions once a system enters the one-
sector neo-classical world has also been documented.
35  In all these instances the acceptance of 
initial asymmetry between sectors rather than the neo-classical assumptions of full employment 
and smooth homogeneity can prove helpful to open-minded analysts. 
The pattern of the inter-sectoral terms of trade provides an indication of whether or not 
the dual economy has managed to maintain “balanced growth” and avoided the relative 
agricultural neglect much discussed in the literature.  Finally, we should also note the relevance 
of dualism for contemporary mainstream development models.  The “informal insurance” 
mechanism of Townsend
36 for example, by which farmers smooth consumption by insuring each 
other across space is not radically different from the aforementioned “moral peasant” of Scott
37 
(1976) who is concerned with supporting others over time as well as space. Whether this can all 
                                                 
32 Fei, John C.H., Gustav Ranis and Shirley W.Y. Kuo (1979), Growth with Equity:  The Taiwan Case, Oxford 
University Press. 
33Fields, Gary (1980), Poverty, Inequality and Development, Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
34 e.g. Fields (1980), op. cit 
35 See Fei and Ranis (1997), op. cit 
36Townsend, Robert (1994), ``Risk and Insurance in Village India'', Econometrica, Vol 62, No. 3, pp 539-591. 
 






still be forced into a comforting neo-classical bottle or approaches institutionalized altruism, of 
course, remains a point of contention.  In the former income is allocated ex post after neo-
classical distribution rules are observed, whereas in the latter income is divided ex ante among 
the members of the extended family or wider community.  It is unclear whether the policy 
implications for achieving a successful transition to modern growth differ widely depending on 
which concept is deployed.  But what remains relevant is which model fits better the basic 
empirical reality of wage behavior relative to agricultural productivity change in successful 
countries; which is better suited to analyze agricultural neglect in failure cases; which provides a 
better explanation of the marked rise in a system’s savings rate; which is more capable of 
explaining discontinuities in income distribution and technical choice--one that assumes full 
employment and smooth neo-classical equilibrium everywhere or one that recognizes initial 
underemployment and disequilibrium in the system en route to a one sector modern growth 
epoch. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
The interaction between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors resides at the heart 
of early stage development in many developing countries.  We have in this paper argued that 
dualism, especially focused on its labor market dimension, continues to offer a theoretically 
valid, empirically relevant, and practically useful framework for dealing with this issue. 
After briefly tracing the intellectual history of dualism, we cited and responded to various 
neo-classical critiques, distinguishing between those which can be characterized as of the “red 
herring” or straw man variety and those which are more fundamental and thus need to be 






The key assumption at issue is the acceptance or rejection of an institutional or 
bargaining real wage or income share as an imposed initial condition for an agricultural sector 
composed largely of owner/cultivators and, given very high man/land ratios, resulting in low 
levels of marginal productivity. A wage above this marginal product agreed to by the family, the 
community or the commune, whatever the organizational configuration--and whether in 
agriculture or in informal urban sector activities--is likely to be related but not equal to the 
average product--and that is difficult for adherents to the dominant neo-classical school to 
swallow.  We have tried to respond to various criticisms, including the interpretation of surplus 
labor as zero marginal product labor, instead of simply indicating the existence of disguised 
unemployment, i.e., income or consumption shares exceeding the marginal product.  We have 
characterized the supply curve of unskilled labor in agriculture and the informal urban sector as a 
step function composed of horizontal portions, each indicating the “unlimited” availability of 
labor for commercialized sector absorption over any short period of time.  Concerning the more 
serious challenge to the dualism model, the finding of an inelastic supply curve of agricultural 
labor, our response was two-fold:  that we see no inherent conflict between cross-sectional 
micro-econometric findings in the neo-classical tradition and dualism’s effort to trace the 
dynamic time series of the inter-sectoral reallocation process at the macro level over time; 
second, that we find it not surprising that individual agricultural workers, even if underemployed 
due to the lack of cooperating factors, work long hours and have very little leisure left to 
surrender in response to a higher wage. 
We, finally, inquired into the usefulness of the dualism concept for explaining both 
historical and prospective country development experience, as well as its relevance in general to 






historical experience of such countries as England, Japan, and Taiwan and believe it is likely to 
continue to be relevant for China, India, parts of Africa and Latin America, among others. We 
believe, moreover, that there is ample room for further exploring the relationship between neo-
classical insurance and classical altruism models as well as for forging better connections 
between the new behavioral economics and a revived application of dualism to both 
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